RESEARCH ARTICLE

The European Unions' International Relations: A Theoretical View

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A B S T R A C T

This article explores major theoretical approaches to the study of European integration, European Union (EU) as a global power, and the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. The argument presented here is that only a combination of both International Relations and European integration approaches will allow us to understand the very premises of the European integration project in terms of both internal and external – international-aspects. This approach will be complementary to the attempts by researchers those who call to mainstream European studies and an appeal in favor of abounding the project of conceptualizing the EU as a single case or as being *Sui generis*. This article argues that, despite serious •

literature to the existing political entities seems less relevant to study EU due to the union's unique identity. Theories of EU integration are unable to explain or predict the process of integration, but they are normally outpaced by events.

Keywords: European Union, Foreign policy, Integration, International relations, Theoretical approaches

1. INTRODUCTION

The literature of international relations, especially in the area of foreign policy analysis (FPA), has not found it easy to accommodate the European Union (EU) fully in its study of the international system, its processes and its evolution (Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 5). The scholars

regard. Rosamond (2000) suggests a number of reasons, including "the international relation (IR) theorists ignored the development of a Common European Foreign Policy or treated purely as empirical event" (p. 16).

Acharya points to the very foundation of IR literature as the main reason for not incorporating the study of regions

and regionalism into the main realm of international study.

need of IR as to be committed to pluralistic universalism, and integrating the study of regions, and regionalism into the central concern of IR. (Acharya, 2014. p. 647) Moreover,

Wallace (1994), there are three possible reasons for that: First, the most mainstream theories of international politics

state nor a traditional alliance). Second, IR theory has a bias

international cooperation. Third, EU integration is more on domestic, trade, agriculture, money than on Common Foreign and Security policy. Finally, another more general reason is related to the scholarly identity of leading intellectuals of IR.

Friedrichs (2004) argues that "since its establishment as independent social science field of study, IR has been

classified as an American discipline of the social science and that has come to be accepted by an increasing majority of scholars all over the world" (pp. 1-2). Friedrichs, then, explains the consequences of such scientific hegemony on the field itself and the capability of non-American scholars in expanding the horizon of IR theories and in developing new approaches. Friedrichs argues that "such intellectual hegemony has become as structural bias in which American scholars have been seen as producers of the IR field by putting themselves or by others into the center and the rest into the periphery. To that end, he suggests to the Western European communities of IR scholars to overcome their status as dependent peripheries" (Friedrichs, 2004. pp. 1-2). Consequently, the study of regionalism in IR seems to be less conspicuous, if not excluded.

2. CLASSICAL EXPLANATIONS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

2.1. Federalism
Federalism proposes a normative account rather than analytical in the way that it is more concern with debate on why sovereign states should form a federation rather than providing an explanation of why they might do so (Bergmann and Niemann, 2013. p. 3). For federalists, in general, the main problem in IR is the absence of central authority, anarchy, because the independence of multiple nation-states brings mistrust, reciprocal threats, rivalry, and violence (Andreatta cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 20). The main focus of the federalist approach was security issue, so the ultimate premise of federalism is that federation would bring a more stable interaction among various nation-states in a European continent. "They thought that decentralization of sovereignty had been the root cause of conflict, in Europe, they were skeptical about conventional remedies for interstate anarchy, such as diplomacy and the balance of power. Federalists had advocated the ideas of the abolition of national independence and the fusion of different political entities into one" (Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 20).

According to the federalist account, "the reasons for unification are ultimately political to tackle international anarchy, so, by relying on the classical distinction between 'high politics,' which concerns life and death issues of political order and violence and 'low politics,' which revolves around economic and social questions, federalism is situated firmly on the first side by stressing more on the political groups" (Andreatta cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 21). Finally, it seems

that the achievement of a common foreign and defense policy is parallel with the main aim of federalists.

2.2. Functionalism
The other classical approach to European integration derives from the functionalist school. Hill and Smith (2005) also found compare to federalist, functionalists believed that modern society was increasingly dominated by matters of "low politics," including the welfare of citizens and economic grows. According to them, "the fundamental motive for integration would not therefore concern the legal relationships between political communities but would stem from the inability of nation-states to provide basic services to their citizens (Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 21). From such a perspective, the first school, federalism, seems to deal with groups, but the last one, functionalism, stresses the significance of individuals. Saurugger (2014) explains that "the central thesis of functionalism is the belief that the political game *per se*, i.e., politics, stands in the way of the creation of favorable social conditions for all. Ideological positions harbored by states are a powerful factor working against the collective wellbeing and which can also, in fine, lead to war" (p. 18).

2.3. Neofunctionalism
The neo -functionalism, which became a permanent approach of integration study in the 1960s, utilized Mitrany's functionalist framework of analysis, and its emphasis on "low politics," but agreed with federalism, in contrast with Mitrany's account of functionalism, on the desirability and feasibility of a traditional union and a superstate, eventually with its own foreign and defense policy (Andreatta cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 21). However, the two schools, federalism and neofunctionalism are radically different in terms of their identified mechanism behind unification. According to the neo-functionalism perspective, and Andreatta argues "there is, in fact, no conscious and explicit attempt to introduce a new federal constitution, in the words of Ernst Hass, the funding architect of neofunctionalism, "[a] new central authority may emerge as an unintended consequence of incremental earlier steps"(Andreatta cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 21). General distinction between functionalism and neofunctionalism was that, "while functionalism was profoundly anchored in normative thought, espousing conditions designed to bring about a more peaceful and fairer world, neofunctionalist approaches to integration are analytical, seeking to understand the reasons for, process leading to, and consequences of, regional integration" (Saurugger, 2014. p. 34). She explains that by proposing a study of domestic factors to explain regional integration, neofunctionalism was clearly opposed to the dominant IR paradigm of the time, neorealism, which

explained regional integration by looking at exogenous, i.e., the existence of external enemy and the desire of small states to join forces with larger ones to increase their influence (Saurugger, 2014. p. 34).

According to neofunctionalism, the key factor encouraging actors to create supranational political communities was not David Mitrany's "technocratic automatism," but rather the rational action of a political and administrative elite seeking to defined its own interests (Saurugger, 2014. p. 36). Haas (1968) explains the main elements of the neofunctionalist theory, as follows:

The decision to proceed with integration or to oppose it rests on the perception of interests and the articulation of specific values on the part of existing political actors. Rather than relying on a scheme of integration which posits "altruistic" or "idealistic" motives as the conditioners of conduct, it seems more reasonable assuming the pluralistic basis of politics here used to focus on the interests and values defended by the major groups involved in the process, experience showing that these are far too complex to be described in such simple terms as "the desire for Franco-German peace" or the "will to a United Europe." As the process of integration proceeds, it is assumed that values will undergo change that interests will be redefined in terms of a regional rather than a purely national orientation and that the erstwhile set of separate national group values will gradually be superseded by a new and geographically larger set of beliefs (pp. 13-14).

This quotation explains some the key ideas of the neofunctionalist approach, including underlying the complexity of variables leading to political decisions, and it also highlights the consequences of integration process such as the change in values, beliefs, and ideas. Another key assumption, argues Rosamond (2000), was that "politics is group-based activity," then he explains further, "neofunctionalism by emphasizing on actors and their interaction in terms of process rather than outcomes, and as the process emerged from a complex web of actors pursuing their interests within a pluralistic political environment" that neofunctionalism's appearance coincided with the development of pluralism in political science (p. 55).

The neofunctionalism approach is found on the two main assumptions, spill-over and transfer of loyalty, respectively.

2.3.1. The first assumption, spill-over
In terms of the notion of spill-over, for all neofunctionalist concepts, it is the key-driven force behind all integration

processes. Lindberg (1963) defines spill-over as "a situation in which the original action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which, in turn, create a further condition and a need for more action and so forth" (p. 10). Rosamond (2000) provides an example model of the spill-over impact on EU integration, he explains that, "exchange-rate coordination would then imply the need for wider cooperation in monetary policies, and this, in turn, would then lead to the establishment of an economic and monetary union" (p. 60). According to neofunctionalists, there are two types of spill-over, functional and political. The first kind refers to inter-connection of various economic sectors or issue, and the integration in one area is spilling over into others. Political spill-over is the creation of supranational governance models, such as the EU (Saurugger, 2014. p. 39).

The second assumption of neofunctionalism, transfer of loyalty, is intertwined with political spill-over as in whatever form it took, it requires a process of loyalty transference. The concept was central to Ernst Haas's original definition of political integration. Haas (1968) explains that "political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national sittings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activates toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states (p.16).

Then, Haas (1968) explains how such action is interconnected with the concept of spill-over, he asserts that "the idea went that citizens would also transfer their allegiances to the new supranational institutions and, in doing so, further drive the integration process (Hass, 1968. p. 49). Despite such explanations, Saurugger (2014) criticizes Hass for his lack of model of explanation of such transformation in loyalty, he argues that "concentrating on governmental, political, and technocratic, the author did not provide a model to explain the transfer process in fact, only the transfer of loyalty by the national political elite, in favor of a technocratic supranational body, was originally envisaged" (p. 43). The absence of external factors in neofunctionalist explanation had challenged the expectation of spill-over assumption. Haas admits such underestimation of external factors; he explains that "understanding regional integration requires knowledge of member states' external relations with states other than those members of the integration scheme." Then, he clearly admits that there is a short sight in spill-over perception, he explains that "when changes in the international system are perceived both by the governmental elite and non-state actors, the limits of automatic spill-over are reached" (Saurugger,

2014. p. 41). Finally, in neofunctionalist framework, due to its emphasis on "low politics" and its traditional distrust for power politics, foreign policy is neglected to an ancillary position (Andretta cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 22).

2.4. Intergovernmentalism

The intergovernmental approach premised to be an alternative approach to neofunctionalism as its main contributors established the theories main assumptions as to be an answer to the critiques of neofunctionalist. Stanley Hoffmann, the founding father of intergovernmentalism, emphasizes the internal diversity of states involved in the European integration process as opposed to Haas's and Lindberg's assumption of convergence of elites. He rejects the idea of spill-over, as he argues that "integration is the result of intergovernmental bargaining, which does not lead automatically to new policy areas being integrated" (Hoffman cited Saurugger, 2014. pp. 54-55). The intergovernmentalists are divided into two main groups, the contributors of conventional intergovernmentalism, and those who advocate liberalist perspectives, liberal intergovernmentalist, (LI).

Among the first group of conventional intergovernmentalists, four conceptual contemporary intergovernmentalist approaches have emerged in EU studies.

2.4.1. Group 1

A first group analysis: The state in concentrating specifically on governmental elites and their actions. Stanley Hoffmann was the main contributor of this particular intergovernmentalism school of integration theory. According to Hoffmann, the real architectures behind integration are the main political actors, i.e., heads of state and government, including the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, economy, and finance. In his main criticism of neofunctionalist, he reveals another key factor that needs to be taken into consideration in the integration process, which is the context that the state, the government, actually acts (Hoffman cited Saurugger, 2014. p. 57).

In the conceptualization of European integration, Hoffmann's main assumption is included of two central ideas which are also considered to be the central assumption of the realist approach in IR.

The first assumption, the international system produces more diversity than coherence between its central unities, states. Since the situation of each state is unique in the world, cooperation between states cannot lead to a homogenous system, rather to diversity, highlighted by intergovernmental

bargaining in which individual leaders exert influence to various degrees (Hoffman cited Saurugger, 2014. p. 58). On the basis of this hypothesis, Hoffmann believes that the possibility of integration within the realm of international affairs is subject to the issue of government autonomy and state identity.

The second central assumption is that there is a difference between the economic domain and the political domain, and there is always a preponderance of politics over the economy. Hoffman argues that "the self-propelling power of the unifying process is severely constrained by the associates' view on ends and means. To go 'beyond the nation-state,' one must do more than set up procedures inadequate 'background' and 'process condition.' A procedure is not a purpose, a process is not a policy" (Hoffmann, 1991. pp. 83-84). In this hypothesis, Hoffmann tries to explain the logic behind integration, which he beliefs it is diversity, not spill-over as suggested by neofunctionalist. Finally, Hoffman's approach, however, according to Rosamond, characterizes him more as a gifted commentator of European affairs than an integration theorist attempting to compete with the complexity and richness of neofunctionalist accounts (Rosamond, 2000. p. 50).

2.4.2. Group 2

The second group of conventional intergovernmentalists, they assert that the evolution of the EU has contributed to the preservation of the nation-state as the main actor in the IR realm. That assumption roots its foundation in a historical account of European integration by Milward, in the book "the European rescue of the nation-state," in 1992. Without European integration, the nation-state could not have offered its citizens the same level of security and prosperity that it has done, in Western Europe at least.

After 1945, the European nation-state rescued itself from collapse, created a new political conscience as the basis of its legitimacy, and through changes in its response to its citizens, which meant a sweeping extension of its functions and ambitious reassured itself as the fundamental unit of political organization … Interdependence is not, therefore, a phenomenon which has progressively and inexorably developed in 20th-century Eastern Europe. States, far from being its helpless prisoner, have actively sought to limit its consequences (Milward, 1992. pp. 3-8).

Saurugger (2014) argues that Milward has challenged the conventional views in regard to European integration as a process to provide an alternative to a nation-state in the form of

a EU. She explains that, according to Milward, "integration was, therefore, the conscious outcome of European governments' decision to pool sovereignty in certain areas. It is not human idealism which led to the European integration, but the self-centered realism of powerful governments" (pp. 60-61).

2.4.3. Group 3

The last group of conventional intergovernmentalist, they refer to the influential approach of the two-level game in the international negotiation theory. This approach is a combination of number of approaches including decision-making and theories in IR. According to Saurugger (2014), "the two- level game is based on an assumption that the processes that occur within a state substantially influence the behavior of the state at the international level. Thus, states are chief negotiators at two tables. What happens at the international level, in turn, influence national polices" (p. 63). On the basis of this hypothesis, the national and international polices are closely linked, and the two-level of analysis, national and international, are intertwined and not independent. This conceptual framework has applied to a number of case of the EU institutions, the EC-USA agricultural negotiation as part of the Kennedy Round (1964–67), for example. In the case of assessing the success of the approach, Saurugger argues that "approaches analyzing the interaction between the national and international levels in bilateral or multilateral negotiations have expanded the horizon of intergovernmentalist account. However, such approaches are remaining far from providing a full account for the integration process (Saurugger, 2104. p. 66)."

LI emerged as contemporary intergovernmentalist account with an attempt to explain a puzzle of the relaunch of European integration by the end of the 1980s despite the ultimate change in the international system from being bipolar to unipolar as result of the Soviet Union collapse, in 1992 (Saurugger, 2014. p. 67). To that end, liberal governmentalism proposes two general factors, including intergovernmental bargaining and national interests. LI bases on the study of the behavior of economically rational actors, hence it focuses on political and social interactions in economic integration.

Through a serious of publication from 1992 to 1995, Andrew Moravcsik, one of the leading authorities in the approach, demonstrated two main assumptions for the LI approach. The first hypothesis is that "national preference represented at international level had obvious national origins." Second central idea contracted on the assumption that "states wish to reduce transactions costs in an open economy, so European integration can be considered as collective action seeking to optimize gains for each state" (1992, 1995). In general, LI try

to explain why sovereign states agree to pool their sovereignty into supranational institutions. For LI, European integration is the result of a strategic calculation by member governments to promote their key economic interests, and of a serious of rational choices made by national elites (Saurugger, 2014. p. 68). In this respect, LI seems similar to Milward's historical account of European integration.

After analyzing a number of key periods in European integration, Moravcsik provides a conclusion. In his remark, Moravcsik asserts that "European integration occurred for reasons of economic interest, a possible economic boom and new markets with the huge possibility for exposition. He then argues that "other factors, geopolitics, ideology, and idealism, have undoubtedly influenced the integration, but only marginally and therefore deserve less attention" (Saurugger, 2014. p. 68). By focusing on economic interest, liberal intergovernmentalist intends to give empirical account to the very premise of liberal intergovernmentalism, which proposes economic interest as the real motive for any regional integration. The second idea core idea of LI is the notion of international bargaining as three-stage process, and as the second pillar in the integration process. The stages are as follows:

1. The formation of national preference driven by issues specific, mostly economic, interests.
2. Inter-state negotiations based on asymmetrical interdependence between member states.
3. The choice of the supranational institution which reflects an interest in securing credible member state commitments. (Sauragger, 2014. p. 72).

Finally, liberal governmentalism had faced a number of critiques. The main one could be the possibility to consider economic reasons as the predominant force driving integration, argues Saurugger (2014) also argues, "whether it is appropriate to reject the ideological reasoning of the Founding Fathers altogether" (p. 73).

3. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND IR THEORY

3.1. Realism

The integration theories have been criticized mainly on two counts. According to Filippo Andreatta, first, the integration theorists, their emphasis was too Eurocentric. The schools of integration approaches were in fact, formulated in general terms, but they highlighted characteristics of the process of European integration, which were not to be found in other region of the world. Second, they employed a teleological approach, taking eventual full integration for granted, and

understanding both the potential resistance of the nation-state as well as the possibility of forms of integration which could stop short of the creation of a superstate (Andreatta cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 23) . The continuation of the European security cooperation, the European Political Cooperation exactly, in the post -cold War era, as well as European integration in general, posed a puzzle for realist theory. Krotz and Mahar (2011) explain that, "with collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw pact, European states no longer faced a threat to their political and territorial integrality, accordingly, many realists expected European integration would be weakened or recede in these areas, and some even anticipated power competition to return to European continent" (p. 557). Such a pessimistic view for the possibility of international cooperation has rooted in the realist main assumptions in regard to the nature of international system.

Realism was dominant paradigm in the study of IR, and it was based on the three main assumptions, including the state is the dominant actor and acts as a coherent, unitary, and rational unit in the international system, IR is in a state of anarchy, and in the absence of higher authority politics is determined by military consideration and war is therefore always a possibility (Krotz and Mahar, 2011. p. 557) . In general, realists are conscious about the possibility of international cooperation, which is other than for security reasons. For example, Mearsheimer (1994. p. 5) argues that "the most basic motives driving states is survival and states want to maintain their sovereignty" (p. 10). In their explanation of European integration, realists are proposing security reason and balance

of power as main motivations by European member states to continue cooperation in the aftermath of the Cold War.

Jones attributes the increase in intra-European security cooperation to changes in the structure of both the international system and the regional system in Europe following the end of the Cold War. Two subsequent developments changed the security environment in Europe and potentially threatened its stability.

He explains that "first, a unified Germany emerged as a potential regional hegemony. Then, in the early 1990s, the United States began to rapidly reduce its troop's presence on the continent, raising concerns about its long-term commitment to European security" (Jones, 2007. p. 22). On containing Germany, Joseph Grieco, elaborating on an earlier insight by Morgenthau (1973) suggests that European integration may be the result of the attempts of other member states to constrain Germany, especially after it has emerged potentially stronger after unification (p. 509). According

to Grieco (1995), "if states share common interests and undertake negotiations on rules constituting a collaborative arrangement, then the weaker but still influential partners will seek to ensure that the rules so constructed will provide sufficient opportunities for them to voice their concerns and interests and thereby prevent or at least ameliorate their domination by stronger partners" (p. 34). The second reason, according to Jones was to increase Europe's ability to project power abroad and to decrease its reliance on the USA. Jones (2007) explains that "European leaders believed that aggregating power was necessary to decrease reliance on the United States and increase their ability to project power abroad. Power and autonomy are important because they make European states more secure and increase their ability, as already stated, to influence, deter, and coerce others. This has been particularly true since American and European security interests steadily began to diverge with the collapse of the Soviet Union" (p. 22).

However, realists have a different view in regard to the motivation to balance the US hegemony, and they hold perspectives on whether this balancing is of the "hard" or "soft" power type, for example, Brooks and Wohlforth (2008) see no evidence of such balancing. They argue that "the real motivation behind the increase in intra-European security and defense cooperation is more related to regional security concern rather than balancing American ambitions" (pp. 80-83). Lieber and Alexander (2005) take the same but a bit radical view on such balancing, they argue that "European security and defense cooperation are not in such scale to be counted to balance U.S. preponderance" (p. 111). Art (2011) takes issue with both of these views. First, he argues that "the motive behind the EU's effort to increase its security and defense capabilities is clearly a case of balancing the United States" (Art cited Krotz and Mahar, 2011. p. 562). Then, he argues explains that "specifically, Britain and France launched ESDP to enhance their political influence within the transatlantic alliance through soft balancing, but not to challenge America's military hegemony with hard balancing" (Art cited Krotz and Mahar, 2011. p. 562). In the case of cooperation on common foreign policy that issue could be conceptualized as a strong and permanent form of alliance (Andreatta cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 27). Paul Schroeder has suggested that "alliances are formed for two main purposes, including capability aggregation and the control of allies" (Schroeder cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 27).

Snyder explains how these two missions is undertaken, "in order to gain on these two fronts, states are willing to limit their own autonomy and follow the presentations of

alliances and other international agreements" (Snyder, 1997). Andreatta argues that "integration could represent a more dramatic loss of autonomy justified by an equally dramatic increase in common capabilities and in the capacity for mutual control" (Andreatta cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 27).

Despite its attempt to explain European integration, according to Wayman and Diehl (1994), "realism is not well designed to explain the political integration of Western Europe" (p. 17). Andreatta argues that "the success of European integration and the beginning of European foreign policy have somehow forced realists to give an explanation to these phenomena, even at the cost of adapting their main theories" (Andreatta cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 25). According to Grieco, "the Europe well for integration creates a problem for realist theory" (Grieco cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 25). Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neorealism, has proposed a solution to the question of European integration within the framework of contemporary realism. First of all, Waltz (1979) argues that, in general, integration is an exceptional event. Although the integration of the nation is often talked about, it seldom takes place. Nations could mutually enrich themselves by further dividing not only the labor that goes into the production of goods, but also some of the other tasks they perform, such as political management and military defense (p. 105).

Then, he proposes a reason for integration; he explains that "there are exceptions to this rule, as there is the fact that some states may persistently seek goals that they value more highly than survival" (Waltz, 1979. p. 92). However, Waltz proposes that such an exceptional event would not change the basic foundation of the international system. Waltz (1986) argues that "even if it eventually took place, integration could only alter the distribution of power among different units (for example, the United States of Europe would become a world superpower), but it could not alter basic characteristics of the international system, as the fusion of several states into one does not alter the anarchic relationship between new unit and all other ones which have not participated in the union" (p. 226). Waltz (1986), another neorealist, argues that "there is no possibility for the creation of a world, or even regional, government: What emerges are alliances that states enter into out of self-interest. Only under certain circumstance

(in this point, he supports Waltz idea of seeing integration as an exceptional event) does regional cooperation become possible" (Walt cited Saurugger, 2014. p. 61).

3.2. Liberalism
The liberal paradigm is more easily adapted to explain European integration and the emergence of a European

common foreign policy for two reasons. According to Filippo Andreatta, on the one hand, liberals adopt a more flexible approach than realists on the question of the actors in international politics, allowing also for a role of supranational organizations. On the other hand, liberals are generally more optimistic on the prospects of interstate cooperation and are therefore more willing to acknowledge the successes of the European community and the EU (Andreatta cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 28).

These reasons are reflecting the core assumptions of liberalism in the field of international studies. There are four main liberalist approaches which can be applied to study the European integration and the emergence of common foreign policy, including republican, commercial liberalism, liberal community, and institutionalism.

The republican liberalist approach is based on the assumption that domestic regimes have a significant role in the formulation of foreign policy. "Democracies (or Republics, in Kantian language) behavior differently from non-democratizes in the international scene, because they are forced to take the electorate's view into account, because they are governed by complex instructional mechanism, and because they are based on norms prescribing peaceful conflict resolution"(Andreatta cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 28). From such perspectives, European integration could be understood as a result of the democratization in the aftermath of the Second World War, in the Western part of Europe, specifically. The emphasis on the domestic structure has also been theorized by intergovernmentalist.

The second liberalist approach is based on the commercial tradition and profound impact of economic processes. According to the main hypotheses of this school, the resent growth in transnational flows has created interdepended modern societies which have altered the traditional conception of national interests (Keohane and Nye, 1977).

Andreatta explains the interdepend hypothesis, "in particular, security matters have lost their preponderance to economic considerations and the latter force governments to an unprecedented level of cooperation. Then, the difficulty in controlling transnational interdependence with scale of the nation-state has been even created an incentive to pool political resources together by building institutions with sufficient critical mass to deal with the new issues" (that is inconsistency with idea of spill-over, in general, by neofunctionalist) (Andreatta cited in Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 30).

The third liberal approach is based on the assumptions by Franc Schimmelfennig, which he proposed them in his refuting accounts to the LI. Schimmelfennig explains his purpose in proposing such account, "I therefore propose to move beyond the limitations of commercial LI. I formulate building blocks and hypotheses of a theory of liberal community that applies a different variant of liberalism to European integration: Ideational liberalism. A liberal international community is a community of liberal states governed by liberal norms such as peace, multilateralism, and democracy, and based on a post-national, civic identity. Ideational liberalism argues that liberal norms shape the constitutional developments of liberal community organizations and override economic interests and material bargaining power" (Schimmelfennig cited Friedman et al., 2013. p. 553).

According to ideational liberalism's perspectives, international and regional organizations, such as the EU, are not simply functional institutions for managing interdependence and stabilizing cooperation. They represent international communities with distinct identities, values, and norms. For a liberal theory of regional integration, it matters most whether such identities, values, and norms are liberal or not. The international dissemination and institutionalization of liberal ideas strengthen liberal community, and the strength of liberal community strengthens liberal regional integration (Schimmelfennig cited Friedman et al., 2013, pp.259-260).

According to Schimmelfennig (2003), "liberal international communities are defined by two core characteristics. They are made up of liberal states, and they establish a liberal order among these liberal states. In other words, a liberal international community is both a community of liberal states and a liberal community of states" (p. 260). He then explains what are the different features of the liberal community approach, which makes it more academically comprehensive in the case of explaining European integration. First, the main distinction between LI based on commercial liberalism and theory of liberal community based on ideational liberalism is ontological, whereas LI is based on a materialist, economic ontology, the theory of liberal community starts from an intersubjective or idealist ontology according to which social ideas such as values, norms, and identities matter for social processes and outcomes. On the other hand, the theory of the liberal community does not necessarily reject the focus of LI on state or governmental actors, or its assumption of (bounded) rationality and domestic political constraints. Governments may well be both relevant and rational actors, but they act on the basis of ideational preferences and/or in

a community environment, in which identities, values, and norms empower or constrain their actions (Schimmelfennig, 2013. p. 262).

Schimmelfennig's liberal community approach is limited to only those hypnoses that are relevant for the puzzles of LI. First hypotheses, according to Schimmelfennig (2001), "non-liberal states are excluded from membership in the EU. In cases of conflict between material (economic) interests and liberal community norms, the norm of liberal membership overrides the economic interests and the superior bargaining power of the member. The second assumption, "if the transfer of competencies from the state to the EU undermines national liberal and democratic institutions, these institutions (or the functions they perform) are recreated at the supranational level. Whereas commercial liberalism is only concerned with the efficiency of supranational institutions, ideational liberalism claims that they must also be legitimate from a liberal-democratic point of view. This also holds if legitimacy reduces efficiency" (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2006. p. 1147). On the bases of these hypotheses, the theory of the liberal community argues that ideational factors trump economic interests or material bargaining power when community identities, values, and norms are at stake. There is no assumption that such ideational factors produce invariably more integration than economic factors. At times, liberal norms may bring about a larger or more deeply integrated EU than economic interests or bargaining power. On the other hand, however, identities and norms may also prevent steps toward integration that appears functionally efficient. In the case of European common foreign policy that liberalist account may explain why consciences in the area of foreign affairs are not functionally efficient when each member state has its own understanding for the subjective outcome of the policy.

3.3. Constructivism

Constructivist approaches came into the field of the European integration studies at the end of the 1990s. Initially developed in the discipline of sociology, anthropology, and constructivist approaches defend the idea that "reality is socially constructed and that the sociology of knowledge must analyze the processes within which this occurs" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966 cited Sauragger, 2014. p. 145).

In general, constructivists are focusing on the impact of ideational factors (world-view, collective understanding, ideas, norms, values, etc.). On the political action, and how these variables involve in shipping political outcomes? Saurugger (2014) explains the main assumption of constructivism that "constructivism, as its properly known, is found on

the idea that social reality is constructed and reproduced through permanent interaction between social agents. For constructivists, the material world does not present itself as a classified entity, and they insist on the claim that the objects of our knowledge, therefore, do not exist independently of our interpretation and language" (p. 146). She, then, summarizes the key ideas of social constructivism in three claims:

1. Contextualization: Individuals not only act according to a rational cost-benefit analysis but also are embedded in social structure, thus act as "social agents."

2. Coconstitution of agents and structures: Actors and structures are mutually constitutive: Actors shape structures, which, in turn, shape actors.

3. Interests are endogenously constructed: The preference of agents is constituted by structures which not only act as constraints but also shape the way in which actors consider what their interests are (Saurugger, 2014. p. 148).

According to constructivism, the agent is acting according to certain principles which later can be count as the logic of a constitutive plyer. Saurugger (2014) also explains "the logic of appropriateness; actors are more influenced by social norms in their actions and behavior than by any weighing up of the costs and benefits of a particular course of action. It is more a question of behaving 'correctly,' according to criteria established by a society or a group, than of maximizing one's preference – an attitude known as the logic of consequentialism" (p. 147).

In terms of the logic of arguing, Risse (2000) suggests that, "considering the processes of argumentation, deliberation, and persuasion as a distinct mode of social interaction, instead of opposing material interests and ideal variables (world-views) being central factors influencing actor behavior and, subsequently, political outcomes. This logic occupies the middle ground between strategic bargaining and rule-guided behavior. It starts from the assumption that human actors engage in truth-seeking with the aim of reaching mutual understanding. This, however, is only possible if actors are prepared to change their world-view, values, and interests" (p. 1). In the area of foreign policy, the EU could enhance such policy area by defining what would be the EU's criteria for the union's common foreign policy.

Constructivists have analyzed IR as historically and socially contingent phenomena. A constructivist, Wendt (1999) argues that "the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material

forces and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature" (p. 1). Constructivist in IR can be divided into three-movement groups, including modernist/neoclassical, conventional, interpretive, and radical/critical constructivists. Although epistemologically very different, these three movements take a particular interest in two objects, norms and interests. These two concepts are also crucial factors in the context of constructivism in European studies.

According to constructivism, norms coconstitute actor behavior and they make specific behavior possible. To prevail and contained, norms should be internalized by those within a community. Norms are an outcome of social interaction between actors from different communities. For that reason, it is difficult to analyze social norms exogenously, or to spate, them from the social context in which they emerge, transform, or disappear. Saurugger (2014) argues "norms can be divided into groups, regulatory norms, which determine what states should and should not do, and constitutive ones, which create roles, identities, and interests for states" (p. 150). An example of the role of norms within the establishments of EU, the method of decision-making in the European Council of Ministers is through consensus itself a norm constructed by social interaction at the same time the use of this method influences the attitude of member-states representatives in EU negotiations (Saurugger, 2014. p. 151). In terms of the concept of interests, constructivist idea is to redefine the notion of state interest and question several tenets of rational IR theories, which they see as being neither the same of individual interests of national actors or national interest groups as a whole, nor the interests of an elite "disconnected from people," as founded in the LI. Moreover, constructivists reject the simple juxtaposition of interests and institutions. In their view, intersubjective arrangements constitute but also constrain interests.

In their attempt to analyze European integration, constructivist has developed three concepts which each has focused on a number of aspects that considered to be leading motive of European integration, including socialization and learning, collative identity formation, and actor-centered power constriction. Risse (2000) explains "Socialization and learning are perspectives of constructivist which see European integration as socialization and learning process. It causes norms to be internalized and defined through interaction" (p.b). Schimmelfennig explains (2000) more specifically that "member states" perceptions of their political interests evolve due to an international socialization process" (p.b). For constructivist, the starting point for analyzing

European integration, argues Wiener (2006 and 2008), was "a link between the social construction of institutions and the success in implementing rules, norms and legal principles"(p. 54). Saurugger asks about the time frame of the socialization process, "when precisely do socialization processes occur?" Socialization occurs when norms, world-view, and collective understanding are internalized, and then subsequently codified by a group of actors (Schimmelfennig and Risse cited Saurugger, 2014. p. 153).

In the case of learning and European integration, the conceptualization of learning has two advantage of undersetting the subject. First of all, it shows that certain actors succeed in imposing their interpretation of social phenomena on others not only because they have the necessary authority. Their arguments are percussive because they have managed to create a common understanding of a problem and, as such, they hold a legitimate position through the broader social context in which they are embedded (Jobert and Muller 1987; Dimitove and Rhinhard 2005 cited Saurugger, 2014. p. 154) . The second advantage is about the levels where reality is constituted. Reality is constructed by the individual, the groups which it belongs, the media or, more generally, by the messages transmitted on several levels: Locally, regionally, nationally, Europe wide or more internationally (Saurugger, 2014. p. 155).

The second perspective of constructivists in European studies, it is the issue of the social construction of a European identity which has emerged as a response to the question of how a common European identity had been constructed. In this respect, the common assumption among constructivists is that European integration leads to the emergence of a transnational identity. In the two approaches presented above, there is a lack of clear respect to the impact of power relations and strategic behavior of policy agents. The third perspective by constructivists, actor-centered constructivism, had developed to accommodate these limits in the two previous accounts. The main assumption of this approach is that Saurugger (2014) explains "actor behavior is influenced by beliefs and ideas framed by specific power constellations" (p. 152).

Finally, in terms of constructivist view on European common and defense policy, Krotz and Mahar (2011) summarized the constructivist scholars' estimation to the possibility of the institutionalization of the common foreign and defense policy.

A number of scholars (and not only those studying strategic culture) and policy practitioners have claimed that European foreign policy, security, and defense, (if they are to grow beyond current roles and capabilities), will require a foundation of shared interests, values, priorities, perceptions of threat legitimate means and ends for the use of military force, as well as agreement on Europe's proper role in the world. If disagreement or divergence on these issues persists, many academics and policymakers believe, then cooperation in these policy areas is unlikely to develop and consolidate (p. 256).

4. DECISION-MAKING AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The emergence of decision-making as an approach to the study of international politics was an outcome of attempts by scholars of "behaviorist" school of IR. They were essentially unsatisfied with leading approaches of the study of international political phenomena, including the emphasis on national power and national interests. Among the leading founders of the decision-making approach, Snyder (1916–1997) argued that "studying these phenomena were not helpful in explaining the why of governmental behaviors. Then, he proposed that "we define state action as the behavior of its official decision-makers, thus providing a clear empirical focus for studying the behavior of nation-state, as well as, other political entities" (Snyder cited Sapin, 2002. pp. 7-8). Snyder et al. (2002), (in their writing "foreign policy decision-making," which became a funding work for the decision-making approach) contributed to IR theory to identify the point of theoretical interaction between the most important determination of state behavior, material, and ideational factors. Snyder (2002) explains they argued "the point of interaction is not the state and that is where classical and even contemporary IR theory is lacking and needs augmentation, but the point is the human decision-maker" (pp. 3-4). Decision-making approach has founded on the premise that it will be a distinct approach to IR, an approach does not describe and measure interactions, but rather study the formulation and execution of policy. Hudson explains why decision-making approach is needed in the IR theory. Hudson also argues that "if one wishes to probe the 'why' questions underlying the events, conditions, and interaction patterns which rest on state action, then decision-making analysis is certainly necessary. We would go so far as to say that the 'why' questions cannot be answered without analysis of decision-making" (p. 7).

The decision-making approach is founded on a number of assumptions and principles. Assumption one that a

fundamental need in the field of international politics at this time is more effective and more explicit conceptualization (Snyder et al., 2002. p. 26). Snyder et al. (2002) try to justify their claim of the need for an explicit theory in IR study. They argue that "all attempts to describe and explain human behavior require that what has already transpired be recaptured not in all its original detail, but selectively according to a scheme employed by the reporter or observer. Assumption two that any interpretative scheme must meet certain tests including operational, predictive, and efficiency. On the basis of these hypotheses, decision-making approach can be counted as a valid and justified theory of IR. The third assumption that the basis for a general theory of interpretational politics does not exist at this time. Here, they try to prove the validity of inclusive frameworks, in general, including decision-making, as more possible attempt to conceptualize IR in compare with any impossible effort for establishing a general theory for IR. Beside assumptions, decision-making approach has the main characteristic which is one fruitful method of altering the

observer to the major determinants of state behavior. From such a perspective, politicians in the form of decision-makers are the real master of the state's action. Such emphasis on the impact of policymakers can be understood as an attempt to take into account sociological variables in state behavior, and

it can also be analyzed as a refutation against the objective reality assumption of contemporary approaches by decision-making theorists. Most of the contemporary approaches of IR hold the idea that objective reality in effect determines or prescribes the behavior of the state. That according to the advocators of decision-making approach, the contemporary theories of International Relations propose a deterministic

type of explanation to the state behavior (pp.27-49). Mainstream IR theories prescribe international politics as ultimately determined by causes regarded as external to the will of individual decision-makers.

The first advocators of decision-making approach have a definition for international politics with proposing great respect to the role of political entities above all national states. They explain that "we believe that those who study international politics are mainly concerned with the action, reaction, and interaction among political entities called national states" (Snyder et al., 2002. p. 55). Snyder et al. (2002) continue on their attention to the statutes on nation-states in the IR field, "we are also assuming that the nation-state is going to be the significant unite of political action for many years to come. Strategies of action and commitment of resources will continue to be decided at the national level" (p. 58). That does not mean, the decision-making approach neglects the role and existence of international

organizations and supranational entities. They explain their position in regard of non-nation-states unites. It does not blind us to the development or existence of supranational forces and organizations. The basic question is solely how the latter are to be treated. We prefer to view the United Nations as a special mode of interaction in which the identity and policymaking capacity of individual national states are preserved but subjected to different conditioning factors. The collective actions of the United Nations can hardly be explained without reference to the action of the various capitals (Snyder et al., 2002. p. 58). It may be true to the development and existence of the EU. The main contribution of the decision- making approach to the IR study is the theory's perception of the status of the state, and more precisely, how state should be represented and how its role should be analyzed. "State action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state. Hence, the state is its decision-makers" (Snyder et al., 2002. p. 79). On the basis of

this hypothesis, the state is not an absolute abstraction unite, but decision-makers can be count as the personification of such imaginary entity. To explain how decision-makers reach to the final stage of a decision, the decision-making approach explains how actors are oriented to action, and it considers agents as a participant of a system of action. Snyder et al. (2002) explain that "the definitions of the situation which we consider to be central to the explanation of state behavior results from the decision-making process in an organizational context" (p. 76). In the same respect, Allison and Zelikow (1999), the essence of decision, explain the impact of the organization in shaping the behavior of decision-makers.

For some purposes, government behavior can usefully be summarized as action chosen by a unitary, rational decision-maker: Centrally controlled, completely informed, and value maximizing. However, a government is not an individual … It is a vast conglomerate of loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own. Governments define alternatives and estimate consequences as their component organization process information; governments act as these organizations enact retunes … Thus, government behavior relevant to any important problem reflects the independent

output of several organizations, partially coordinated by government leaders (Allison and Zelikow, 1999. p. 143).

Snyder et al. (2002) are explaining the position of the organizational unit on the capability of decision-makers. The argue that "the unite is an observer's analytical device to allow identification and isolation of those actions and activities which are a concern to him" (p. 82). In the case of foreign policy, it can be arguing that there is an organizational unite

which is constituted to be able to select a course of action to achieve setting objectives, and it also subjects foreign policy decision- makers to its setting restricted options. Foreign policy as to particular form of decision-making, it can be explained from a decision-making approach's perspective.

Foreign policy decision-making (FPDM) refers to the choices individuals, groups, and coalitions make that affect a nation's actions on the international stage (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010. p. 3). According to Mintz and DeRouen (2010), there are four determinants of foreign policy decisions, which each has its own impact on the decision-making the process. There is consisting of the decision environment, psychological factors (in the case of politicians), international factors, and domestic factors (ibid.4). Furthermore, FPDM consists of four components:
1. Identifying the decision problem,
2. Searching for alternatives,
3. Choosing an alternative, and
4. Executing the alternative. (Robinson and Snyder, 1965. p. 437 cited Mintz and DeRouen, 2010. p. 4).

Mintz and DeRouen (2010) explain the reasons for studying FPDM and the approach's main contribution to the study of IR.

There is a great need to reference to the decision making of individuals to understand any crisis and war. In the case of FPDM, the analysis from such perspective can uncover cognitive processes that lead to foreign policy making and "get into the minds" of leaders who make the decisions. It can also help identify unique and general patterns of decisions and generate insights about leadership styles and personalities that cannot be revealed through a systematic approach to FPA (p. 6)

To a great extent, the decision-making approach to foreign policy has been founded on the basis of the assumption of the unitary, rational actor, which it, since its emergence has highlighting the psychology of FPDM of groups, collations, and of course, and leaders (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010. p. 6).

Such a hypothesis of the rational actor is parallel with a realist approach to the statues of state in the context of IR. According to the realist paradigm, it assumes that states, as a unitary actor, act to maximize gains and minimize losses while navigating an anarchical international system (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer, 1995 cited Mintz and DeRouen, 2010. p. 7). The assumption became a model, and a linchpin of FPDM, the rational actor model of FPDM. The core of the

hypotheses is that its decision-making is a process which its participants are rational. Allison and Zelikow (1999) defines rationality as a "consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints" then he argues that "the rational decision maker chooses the alternative that provides the consequence that is most preferred" (pp. 29-30).

To explain how a decision is formulated, the FPDM approach is dividing decisions over a number of types on the bases of the level of dependency of a particular decision to the overall of a decision-makers record of decisions. Types are including, one-shot or single decision, strategic and interactive decision, sequential decision, and group decision. Another group type of decisions is divided based on the number of participants, consisting of unilateral, and negotiated. The last group is divided on the base of the number of options, including structural, semi-structured, and unstructured decisions. In the case of EU, Herman (2001) argues, "the union's decision type can be understood as a decision which formulated as a result of the interaction among member states. Besides the division of decision into a number of groups, there are levels of analysis in FPDM. The levels are individual group and coalition" (p. 30).

Again in the case of the EU common foreign policy, the individual level can help to explain an individual member states' foreign policy at the nation-state level. At the group level, it can be used to analyze how foreign ministers of EU member states come to an agreement. Finally, at the coalition level, it may provide an explanation of how the EU and another political player treat each of in the area of foreign policy, for example, the EU and the United States.

5. CONCLUSION

The development of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy is challenging of what has traditionally been defined as a regional actor or treated as an empirical event. The literature of International Relations still does not fully accommodate the EU because the very premises of IR commit to not include regionalism into its portfolio. The evolution of the EU from an economic block to a political union with having a common foreign policy in place ponders students of IR about the need for a pluralistic approach to international studies. Such approach of International Relations should include regionalism, and loosen scientific hegemony.

Major theories of integration studies seem less promising to provide an insightful account to the growing scale of

the European project. However, these theories are helpful in telling the reasons for integration in the first place. Federalism suggests any political or economic platform as a means to bring trust among various nation-states in such anarchy nature of the international system. It pays credit to security factor as a mean motive for any integration projects. Functionalism proposes integration project as a mechanism by sovereign states to enhance their position to meet the growing demand of the population. Functionalism does not concern much with the question of foreign affairs as the state's higher politics, but it focuses more on domestic issues. On the other side, neofunctionalists count foreign policy as a means to prove one entity's chance to increase its influence by joining a political union project. For them, integration spills over from one aspect to another, from economic to political, for example. Such level of integration is an outcome of much serious commitment, transfer of loyalty, which means political actors are looking for a new center beyond national ones.

The idea of spill-over as main factor behind further integration has been challenged by intergovernmentalism. Unlike neofunctionalists, this group believes that what causes integration is bargaining among government officials. A group of intergovernmentalists is going as far as they count integration, EU, as a shield which provides protection to the individual sovereign states of Europe. That is to argue that the realist approach by powerful governments is the real cause, not human idealism, which makes EU thrive. Another group of intergovernmentalists, liberalist, have found their entire argument on the bases of calculation for economic interests as principal factor for further integration.

The integration theories are criticized for being too Eurocentric and neglect the potential resistance of nation-state to the creation of a superstate. The continued development of the European project, in the post-cold War, posed a puzzle to realist thinkers. Classical realists counted the threat of the Soviet Union as the principal motive for Europeans to pursue such an integration project. As Soviet Russia had collapsed, the neorealist pointed to the nature of international structure as main factor that would lead Europeans to remain within the Union. On the other hand, liberalism accepted all possible rational which led to the emergence of the Union, and later, a European common foreign policy. Liberalism is always value interstate cooperation and adopts a more flexible approach to the international system. According to liberalist, the EU is an outcome of democratization which is backed by the domestic structure of member states. They recognize the project as bound of interdependence among

member states to overcome narrow conceptions of national interests. Moreover, for some liberalists, the Union represents a community of liberal states those who believe in liberal principles. For constructivists, the EU is a social project which member states are working together according to the logic of appropriateness. The project is underway to grow because member states are learning to from each other, and they are a question each other's behavior.

Decision-making is another theoretical approach which can unveil different aspects of the EU project. The theory suggests different epistemology to IR. It does not describe and measure interaction, but rather study the formulation and execution of a policy. The whole primes of IR theories are to answer what questions. Decision-making approach tells the answer to why question through underlying the events, conditions, and interactions which rest on the state's action. The approach concerns mainly with a cognitive process that leads someone to make a distinct decision. To understand why a decision is made with such a feature, we need to have clear background of the actor, and deep knowledge of the institutional structure. It may not be helpful in our case to provide a clear path to the development of a European common foreign policy as we are looking for norms not the behavior of an actor and performance of an institution in a certain period of time. Finally, any attempt to theorize the European project may face several serious challenges. The existing theoretical frameworks on different entities are founded difficult if not impossible, to apply on the EU case that is due to the uniqueness of the body.

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