Department of Political Science, Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islamic

University Malaysia, Lumpur, Malaysia

E-mail:

hawkar18@yahoo.com

This paper explores Post-2003 Iraq Conflict Dynamics. The purpose of the paper is to illustrate the crucial problems

affecting the relationships between ethno-sectarian groups in Iraq. The paper also seeks to consider the causes and the

leading factors to the ethno-sectarian dispute in Iraq through the prism of the security problem and argues that in the

ethno-sectarian conflict in Iraq, the security dilemma plays a critical position.

carefully studied and the lessons learnt, the risk will be run of the continuity of this instability and its replication

elsewhere.

The study thus attempts to identify factors that have contributed to conflict ever since 2003. As a result of the ongoing

conflicts and suffering of Iraqis of all ethnic and sectarian backgrounds, the posing of conflicts is a matter of urgency,

for without understanding being provided, there is little hope of a brighter future for Iraq. While academic literature has

explored Iraq's post-2003 plight from a range of angles, as discussed below, this paper presents a fresh perspective

through the use of the theory of the security dilemma, which it is hoped, may contribute to the development of more

effective solutions to the conflict, which has so profoundly scarred Iraq.

In 2003, the Saddam regime was overthrown, and a power vacuum was created, leading to a power struggle involving

sectarian and other groups in Iraq, which were supported by the regional powers. The ethno-sectarian groups felt the

urgent need to ensure their security and ensure their survival in an anarchic situation then existing in Iraq. That lead to

suspicions, threat, and anxiety, the more threats and opportunity lead to a more intense security dilemma, and the more

intense security dilemma led to more dangerous actions and reactions. Due to the security situation, creating militia

ensues when different groups see other groups reinforce cohesion with an outside group or state, different groups do

the same, and each group prepared for defense and offence due to uncertainty.

Therefore, this paper will use the theory of the security dilemma by Barry Posen (1993) to explain the situation in Iraq.

Historical analysis is too suitable for studies that apply the security dilemma theory to ethnic conflict, as Tang (2011)

does in the case of Croatia. Tang states that we should distinguish the existence of a security dilemma from the theory

in Iraq. As anarchy is central to Posen's approach, this would help explain Iraq's anarchic situation and help argue that

historical narratives adopted by ethnic groups are inaccurate and misleading.

This study employs the security dilemma theoretical framework to explore ethnic and sectarian conflict as the

consequences of Iraq's intervention since 2003. It explains the changes following the U.S. intervention in Iraq and the

role of these changes in inter-ethnic and sectarian conflicts in Iraq the broader Middle East. The consequences of

intervention are examined over a 17-year timeframe from the beginning of the intervention in 2003 to 2020. The case

study considers the broader geopolitical context of the Middle East, which is crucial for comprehending the forms that

Iraq's security dilemma has taken. The resulting methodology is qualitative due to the study's nature, based on narrative

and historical analysis, such as face-to-face and telephone interviews with politicians, intellectuals, and other stakeholders

in Iraq. Secondary data have been utilized, such as current statistics, newspaper reports, U.N. documents, and state

elite-led conflict (Collins, 2000). A comparison of Iraq's security dilemmas before and post-invasion Iraq in 2003 may

be an avenue for future research which sheds light upon this assertion and the failures of post-2003 Iraq's early stages

of attempted state-building.

The data for this research were collected from 2019 to October 2020. To optimize the breadth and depth of collected

data, a qualitative method approach was adopted, which included: a preliminary review of the existing literature and

semi-structured interviews with local and national officials, intellectuals and academics, community and religious leaders,

and subject matter experts through face-to-face and telephone interviews. As well, focus group discussions were

conducted in cooperation and support from the Standard-Kurd Foundation, an independent organization, and an

electronic newspaper in Erbil. These included parliamentary representatives, Iraqi government officials, Kurdistan

Regional Government leaders, local civil society actors, and other key stakeholders.

(Yilmaz, 2007). Additionally, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), sectarian conflict implies

asymmetrical conflict involving two or more non-state actors representing different groups. When the groups obtain

assistance from some other country, they are called intrastate internationalized conflict (UCDP, 2020). Hence, Iraq's

conflicts can be described as internal, intrastate, and sectarian conflicts and internationalized intrastate conflicts,

especially since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Regarding ethno-sectarian relations, several studies have argued that political chaos, sectarian violence, and heightened

insecurity in Iraq derive from the U.S. occupation and its failure to uphold peace and order (Kirmanj, 2013). Eric Davis

reflects on disastrous policies such as de-Baathification and the dissolution of Iraqi forces by the Coalition Provisional

Authority (CPA) or the U.S (Davis, 2004). Some blame the Iraqi state designer, Britain, through the Sykes-Picot

shortcoming of this argument is that it tends to enlarge the role of one variable in constructing problems and crisis while

forgetting to merge or identify the causes of correlated factors that are contributing together for ethno-sectarian conflict.

Makdisi in The Culture of Sectarianism explains that foreign actors concentrated society to a simple confessional of

divisions continued to frame policy from that sociological starting point indeed, advancing sectarian identity added

political relevancy (Makdisi, 2000). Also, Fanar Haddad argues that the identity politics in post-2003 in Iraq and sectarian

violence have advanced and receded according to more extensive socio-economic and political condition, however, he

does not explain the main factors that have led to an escalation of sectarian conflict and factors that affect the

from her work is a consideration of the extent to which U.S. intervention and subsequent policy extended sectarian

division. Victoria Fontan argues that sectarian divisions in Iraq were not as deep as believed by the occupation authorities

before the invasion and in the spring and summer of 2003; however, after 2003, the ethno-sectarian relations significantly

worsened (Fontan, 2008). This hints at the significant role of intervention in sparking and drastically exacerbating

conflicts. Caroleen Sayej also argues that the sectarian conflict since 2003 is not related to the apparent historical volatility,

and sectarianism was not natural or inherent to Iraqi culture but resulted from various states and non-state actors

pursuing their own interests (Sayej, 2018).

Specifically, in Iraq, studies have been authored on how the U.S. and the US-led coalition's behavior has posed a severe

challenge to peace and stability. For example, Richard Falk in The Costs of War (2007) illustrates the impacts of the

Iraq War on international law, the U.N., and world security. Studies by Bidle, Friedman, and Long (2012) have explored

2020.

Since Iraq has become another problematic case of military intervention, Iraq's hostilities have captured international

attention. Most of the literature has focused on the reasons for the invasion and the duration of the U.S. occupation of

Iraq, and less on the occupation's aftermath. Limited research has been carried out on the longer-term consequences of

the war. In The Political Road to War with Iraq, Nick Ritchi and Paul Rogers (2007) explore the details of events and

factors leading up to Iraq's intervention by the U.S. They take American national interest into account and illustrate the

role of ideology in Iraq's U.S. intervention. They highlight that the war had an effective end for the U.S.; however, Iraqis'

war experience has never ended.

It must be noted that some scholars have identified other explanations for the outbreak of sectarian identity-fueled

violence. As already alluded to, some blame the modern Iraqi state designer, Britain, through the Sykes-Picot Agreement

of 1916, which arbitrarily and unilaterally imposed a single state upon a heterogeneous population (Ciment, 2015).

and relations, the distinct theological mind-sets of Shiite and Sunni Muslims, and the historical, religious, cultural and/or

linguistic connections, which bound Iraqis with neighboring countries such as Iran and the Arab states. This article

seeks to redress this oversight by accounting for all these issues in as much depth as possible and drawing on the security

dilemma between groups when they fear their security. The theory of the security dilemma is explored below.

This study's theoretical framework is primarily based on Barry Posen's (1993) conceptualization of the security dilemma,

the theory first articulated in the context of international relations between states. Kaufman argues that the security

dilemma is a condition where one side can make the other side less secure (Kaufman, 2001). No single theory exists that

can comprehensively clarify the complexity of the inter-ethnic and sectarian conflict in Iraq. However, it may be argued

that the U.S. intervention in 2003 intensified the possibility of the security dilemma, which has consequently given rise

to ethno-sectarian conflicts in Iraq, which means that foreign patrons to ethnic conflict exacerbate the security dilemma.

Therefore, the study develops Posen's theory of security dilemma as it has been applied to ethnic conflicts in the post-

Cold War period since it provides valuable insights into the analysis of conflicts such as Iraq's. It is applicable too to the

anarchic situation of post-2003 Iraq as anarchy generated fear and uncertainty.

The security dilemma is a fundamental theoretical idea in political science and the study of international relations. It

has been used to explain events such as the First World War, by Robert Jervis in Perception and Misperception in

'the measure a state takes to increase its security usually decreases the security of other states' (pp. 36). Accordingly,

Mearsheimer contends that it is problematic to believe a state may secure itself without threatening another state's

survival (Mearsheimer, 2001). This introduces the impression of relative power, a group's degree of power in relation to

others. This power is often disproportionately distributed and causes conflict: no group can be sure that another group

will not eventually attempt to violate and threaten this power.

Morgenthau's second of his six principles of political realism, in his book Politics Among Nations, explains the security

dilemma further. The principle proposes a nation's interest as being defined in terms of national power (Morgenthau &

Thompson, 1948). This core principle suggests that groups' activities and choices are frequently taken in securing self-

interests by employing power. Both Morgenthau and Mearsheimer consider that actors commonly seek an opportunity

to maintain power. Morgenthau argues that human nature and domestic factors cause actors to seek power; however,

The security dilemma was applied to ethnic conflict for the first time by Barry Posen and used by Tang (2009) to

explain the outbreak of ethnic conflict in the USSR and former Yugoslavia. The theory of the security dilemma, in this

case, concentrates on the nature of the relationship among groups, operating as mentioned in an anarchic system. Posen

argues that the security dilemma appears when conditions within the state resemble the international system's anarchy

(which is more straightforwardly perceptible). Posen writes that the security dilemma explains 'the special conditions

that arise when proximate groups of people suddenly find themselves newly responsible for their own security' (Posen,

1993). The situation arises in anarchy in which different ethnicities are concerned for their survival and have the

intention to intensify their self-defense. However, this action becomes a threat to their rivals, and here a security dilemma

comes about: 'What one does to enhance one's own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure'

(Posen, 1993). The security dilemmas that Posen shows, arises under two unfortunate conditions: the indistinguishability

of offensive and defensive actions and the perception of offensive gains. Consequently, ethnic groups find it difficult

among groups. For stateless ethnic groups existing in anarchical conditions, they may act the way states act for self-help,

thus may accumulate more power than they needed for protection. Furthermore, the security dilemma is related to fear,

which leads to uncertainty in an anarchy-like situation.

Posen's concept of "emerging anarchy" will be applied to post-2003 Iraq, as it was marked by chaos in which various

Iraqi ethnicities and sects are compelled to provide their own security in the absence of effective government. At the

state level, anarchy may refer to a weak authority or absence of a robust operating government, a condition that leads

groups to develop concerns about their security. Anarchy is essential in Posen's approach and illuminates Iraq's situation,

and reveals how the historical perceptions adopted by ethnic groups themselves are inaccurate and misleading. In other

words, animosity between Iraqi ethnic and sectarian groups is a misleading historical perception. Consequently, groups

compete for power and security and are likely to develop their own security capabilities, ironically making the first group

feel more, rather than less, insecure in a vicious cycle.

Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites have been involved in a security dilemma in an "emerging anarchy" since 2003, in which

each group has had to take care of its security. The Iraqi state has been on the edge of collapse following the U.S.

intervention in 2003 and thus has all the hallmarks of an anarchic environment where groups resort to self-help. The

paper outlines the internal consequences of the invasion for how Iraq has suffered from large-scale inter-ethnic and

sectarian conflicts due to the security dilemma and explores how ethnic and sectarian groups have taken the opportunity

to integrate their economy and military forces into those of the central government dominated by Shiites (and previously,

under Saddam, by Sunnis) since each group relies on its command of military and economic assets to consolidate and

maintain whatever power it may have. Meanwhile, the Sunnis' revival against Shiite dominance may also be said to have

instigated insecurity and a Shiite security dilemma, revenge by political and military means, that has again caused conflicts

and some Sunnis' support for terrorist groups. The intensification of sectarian clashes paved the way to further

interventions by neighboring states. Therefore, this paper investigates how these groups approach power for their

security under the security dilemma's appearance in post-invasion Iraq. The study extends the applicability of the security

dilemma by discussing how a weak state like Iraq has been unable to provide security for its citizens and sometimes

even constitutes a threat to parts of the population.

After the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, circumstances badly affected Baghdad-Erbil relations. In 2012, Baghdad

by establishing absolute supremacy over Iraq. However, this step's impact was other than expected, as Baghdad's

perception of Kurdish leaders, who are expected to submit, proved wrong. The armed clash between the Tigris

Operation Command and the Peshmerga forces exacerbated the situation as per the security dilemma and enlarged the

gulf between Baghdad and Erbil.

Meanwhile, two other historical events have significantly affected Baghdad-Erbil relations, the first being the rise of

ISIS and the second the Kurdish referendum for independence in 2017. The emergence of ISIS in northern and central

Iraq and neighboring Syria was a severe challenge for the Kurds. The unpredictable growth of ISIS made the Kurds a

reliable partner for the US-led coalition to curb ISIS. The US-led coalition against ISIS heartened the Kurds, who saw

an opportunity to liberate land seized by ISIS; this land was also the so-called disputed territory, which Kurds have

mostly referred to as "Kurdistani areas," located outside the Kurdish regional administration.

The second event was the 2017 Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum. A large majority of 92 per cent of voters

the case of Iraq can also add further dimensions to the theory. According to Posen, two conditions intensify a security

dilemma. The first is related to the indistinguishability of defence and offence (Posen, 1993). However, the researcher

believes that another dilemma appears because the observations are of the capacity rather than motivation; therefore, it

is essential to focus on groups' motivation more than their capacities.

The second concerns the cause of a security dilemma: the effectiveness of offensive over defensive tactics. According

to Posen, this depends on two variables, technology, and geography (Posen, 1993). Technology affects all states and

groups' military capability, but geography defines the specific circumstances of any occurrence of a security dilemma.

Technology as a factor may be more relevant for the emergency of security dilemmas in the prevailing international

anarchy between states, which may have large arsenals and even nuclear weaponry (as seen in the security dilemmas of

the Cold War era), than for ethno-sectarian groups within a state area, which while supplied with weapons (including by

state actors), are armed to a far lesser degree.

This is complicated somewhat in the Baghdad-Erbil relationship, which is a conflict between the state actor Baghdad

and Erbil's non-state actor. Erbil has been classified as a de facto state by Michael M. Gunter and as a quasi-state by

Aram Rafaat (Rafaat, 2018). However, as shown by the lockdown on much of the Kurdistan Region after the referendum

of 2017 imposed by Baghdad (and neighboring states), the two's powers are unequal. Thus, the security dilemma

between the two deserves to be understood not primarily in technological and military terms but also in political and

economic terms. This phenomenon may be germane to considerations of domestic security dilemmas within states in a

Syria (which Syria does not currently pose as much of a threat due to the ongoing Civil War and the presence of Kurdish

forces in Syria), as well as the central government in Baghdad. As alluded to above, after the 2017 referendum, Turkey,

Iran, and Baghdad closed their borders to the Kurdistan Region. Baghdad even suspended all flights to the Kurdistan

Region, including deliveries of aid to help the fight against ISIS; the people of the Kurdistan Region were held hostage

(Murdock, 2021).

Most importantly, regarding the conditions of fear and security threat (apprehension of malign intentions), the fears

over identity, particularly the fear that one group will attempt to dominate Iraqi identity, leads to the fear of losing other

group identities through assimilation or extinction. This reciprocal fear also contributes to creating an ethno-sectarian

security dilemma. Among the Kurds, for instance, this fear contributes to the argument for self-determination, deriving

from the belief that sovereignty is the protector of national identity when identity depends on the territory. Nationalism

and 2017. In 2012, Baghdad formed a new military force with heavy artillery named the "Tigris Operation Command".

Headed by General al-Zaidi, the unit was sent to Kirkuk's south, long disputed between Erbil and Baghdad. This

aggressive step by Baghdad was a bold move to control the southern neighborhood of Kirkuk. Responding to this

critical situation, the KRG President Masoud Barzani commanded his Peshmerga forces to stand against Baghdad's

aggression, and as a result, a limited armed clash took place (Ihsan, 2016). Also, in October 2017, after the referendum,

the Shiite PMF escalated its confrontation with a section of the Peshmerga forces, mainly those attached to the

Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) (interview with Abdullah, 2020; Dalay, 2017). Later, the Peshmerga forces withdrew

from some areas liberated from ISIS, mainly in Kirkuk and around its borders, and the PMF has settled in, confirming

Baghdad's supremacy. The military confrontation of October 2017 between the two was such a consequence of

reciprocal fear and mistrust as well as competing claims on the so-called "disputed territory"; both sides have highly

partisan military forces, and rivalry between the PMF and the Kurdish Peshmerga challenges the prospects for stability

Additionally, regarding geography, Iraq's ethno-sectarian mosaic makes it prone to conflict. Not every state with a

heterogeneous population experiences the same situation because, as Ellingsen explains, the development of conflict

and internal security dilemma depends on the size and number of the most significant linguistic groups within a country:

a country with the second-largest forming 5 to 20 per cent of the population is at a higher risk of conflict than a country

with a smaller minority group. Larger minorities are more troublesome for central governments to regulate and pose a

more significant threat to conflict (Ellingsen, 2000). The intensity of the Baghdad-Erbil conflict can partly be explained

by the large size of the Kurdish population, who form a quarter of Iraq's overall population (Central Intelligence Agency,

2020).

Large ethno-sectarian groups within a state of anarchy is a crucial aspect of the security dilemma. When a regime has

been weakened, ethno-sectarian groups seek their security and use their power. The Gulf War in 1991 and the sanctions

on Iraq created an anarchy-like situation in Iraq. The Kurds rose against Saddam, a no-fly zone was imposed for their

protection, and the Kurdistan Region was established. The end of the 1990s intra-Kurdish civil war between the

Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan further strengthened the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

After the U.S. invasion in 2003, the Kurds participated with the Shiites in the political process, including drafting the

Iraqi Constitution in 2005, which recognizes federalism in Iraq, further increasing their power.

Nevertheless, Baghdad failed to implement Kirkuk and oil articles, which triggered the old conflict's restart. The Kurds

Political structures within the framework of the security dilemma and the international system's power structure have

had a great deal of influence on Iraqi politics, leading to the conflict between ethno-sectarian groups. In essence, with

the US-led invasion in 2003, the regime collapsed, and a weak government was established, accompanied by a power

struggle and rivalries between Iran and the U.S. and Gulf countries.

Contributing factors already existed before 2003 to influence ethno-sectarian conflict; Saddam's regime epitomised

one ethno-sectarian group (the Arab Sunni-dominated Ba'ath) determined to defend its position. However, the situation

has changed since 2003. The collapse of the Saddam regime, and the emergence of a power vacuum and anarchy, led

regional powers to become deeply involved in Iraq, anxious to protect their interests and security. Regional countries

have exercised substantial political, economic, and security influence in Iraq since 2003. Offensive realist theory argues

that 'great powers seek to maximize their potential; (Mowle & Sacko, 2007); for instance, Iran after 2003 saw in Iraq the

to search for security. These structures can be a formal practice that enforce certain groups' marginalization, such as the

Sunnis, who were excluded from Iraq's institutions by the US-imposed de-Ba'athification policy. Alternatively, structures

can be informal but common practice, such as Baghdad's policy toward the Kurdistan Region through cutting budget

allocations, cultural, ideological, or religious conflicts such as the Sunni-Shiite division mutually hostile Kurdish and

Arab nationalisms. These all intensify the security dilemma.

However, a difficulty in employing the security dilemma arises from the fact that while the conditions of the security

dilemma exist in Iraq, they mainly arise in the broader region that affects the domestic elements; it is imperative to merge

the foreign dynamics with domestic factors ethno-sectarian conflict. Merging the second level of a regional security

dilemma with Iraq's domestic security dilemma demonstrates how a confluence of factors merges in a particular

historical moment to shape a security dilemma's conditions.

Analyzing the security dilemma's structural conditions is essential if policymaking leads to a successful transformation

As these factors and others indicate, like any theoretical frame, the security dilemma limits the researcher's focus; it

falls short in explaining all attitudes, historical identities, and perceptions. While incorporating the valuable insights

gained from applying the security dilemma as contained in this study, future research also has a range of comparatively

unexplored avenues to investigate.

The paper has shown that the security dilemma appears since there is a lack of state order in Iraq and groups aim to

secure themselves. Consequently, the groups seek power, power competition for self-help and security; the security

dilemma highlights that the effort to develop one's security in anarchic circumstances, where the stronger ruling

government is absent, makes others feel insecure. The paper illustrates that the stronger ethnicity and sect creates

uncertainty. Consequences include: intended consequences for more power to a group and less for the state of Iraq, and

unintended consequences (conflict and disputes), such as the disputes and conflicts between the Kurdistan Region with

the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad. The military confrontation in October 2017 was as a result of fear and

mistrust over "Disputed Territory" between Baghdad- Erbil as both sides have biased military forces and a rivalry among

Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the Kurdish Peshmarga, which challenges the prospects of stability in Iraq. The

paper offers the context of rivalry between Kurds, Sunni, and Shiite leaders using traditional military force to defend

their ethnic group by utilizing the security dilemma approach. As the Shiite has dominated, the government and Iraqi

is organized. A focused set of concerns was asked to standardize the data gathered, allowing a vast accumulation of case

study results.

Ethno-sectarian conflict is a useful lens for anyone concerned with the current affairs of Iraq. Ethno-sectarian conflict

in Iraq has evolved through different periods. The roots of conflict in Iraq go back to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of

1916 and Iraq's establishment in the 1920s. The repeated interventions of external actors from the U.S. to Iran in Iraq

serve nothing but the geopolitical goals of those, directly and indirectly, involved in the Iraqi ethno-sectarian conflicts.

Ethno-sectarian conflict in Iraq after 2003 with all its historical dynamics, due to the groups' geographical and structural

size, has impacted political life across Iraq and beyond. Thus, this conflict's resolution would have positive implications

for Iraq's democracy and all socio-economic factors, and indeed across the region.

This paper focused on the domestic causes of ethno-sectarian conflict, the structural factors which have resulted in an

Put simply, the security dilemma is manifested where groups (Iraq's ethnic, sectarian, political, religious, and cultural

groups, and so on) pursue security guarantees that, ultimately, make the group less secure. In the context of a failed state

(in this case, created by the removal of Saddam's regime from power in 2003), Rotberg in 2004 observed the security

problem as one of the failed state factors and a crisis source and conflict. Iraq's citizens, Kurds, and Arabs alike have

lost confidence in their institutions, the factors that lead to a violent conflict. In Iraq, what is seen today is that an

institution such as the Iraqi Army is seemingly incapable of protecting the country's security and sovereignty. However,

Iraq is also unable to protect citizens of various ethnicities and sects in daily life. The Kurds have seen themselves as

left with no option but to rely on their own ethnic forces, the Peshmerga, to defend themselves.

Posen's understanding of the security dilemma considered as a suitable approach for the security and military aspects

of Iraq's ethno-sectarian conflict between Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. However, William Rose's (2000) approach to the

security dilemma, focusing on group relations, influenced the Baghdad-Erbil relationship in the post-2003 period.

through force. This is a critical factor in both short-term disputes and the management of deep-rooted issues, such as

Kirkuk's status. This group hostility is not unique to Iraq or the Shia Arab-Kurdish conflict. However, it has been a vital

factor in escalating the security dilemma, which is also influenced by the Kurds' past and present grievances and the

Shiites' desire for power and security due to their suppression under Saddam.

The paper’s findings indicate that the groups of Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis further exacerbate the security dilemma and

ethno-sectarian strife as mentioned for the events in 2012 and 2017, these groups not only try to evaluate the threats

posed not only by enemy militias but also the existence of all groups in close proximity. Suppose the threats presented

by the opposing group cannot be ignored (due to malign intentions, poor relations, a sudden change in the forces) or

categorized in security terms (possession of arms and militias, military operation, economic gains). In that case, each

group assesses the other's capabilities by the remembrance of historical events. An evaluation of military and economic

capability and purpose may also be dependent on a highly contested historical event or perceived cultural connection,

such as Shiite cooperation with Iran or Sunni cooperation with other Sunni countries in the region. In other words,

while economic and military factors are important, the political context and policymaking capacity of Baghdad and Erbil

are especially germane to concerns and their significant disagreements over the Kurdistan Region expenditure allocation,

the status of the Peshmerga, political and security relations, the future of the contested territory, the essence of Iraq's

federal structure, the redistribution of oil and gas revenues and contracts, and compensation for martyrs' families, among

sees the Kurds as potentially disloyal to Iraq. The buildup of forces on both sides results in a security dilemma. The lack

of an independent, non-sectarian media in Iraq after 2003, as Bilal Said alleges, has further damaged relationships; much

of the media is sponsored by foreign countries, religious sects, and political parties (interview with Said, 2020).

Regional and global interventions have escalated the security issues between Baghdad and Erbil. On one hand, the

Shiites are tied to Iran, which offers its assistance to some of the armed Shiite factions; Tariq Gardi assumes that the

dominance of the Shiite factions in the Nineveh Plain, Sinjar and Kirkuk, have depended on Iranian interference

(interview with Gardi, 2020). Masoud Abdulkhalaq has asserted that sectarian Shiites, taking their lead from Iran, have

no regard for the international state system and dream of uniting the region's Shiite communities under one banner

(interview with Abdulkhalaq, 2020). On the other hand, Kurdish ties with international powers, particularly the U.S.,

may antagonize Baghdad and some of the wider Shiite community. Kurdish-Shiite relations would undoubtedly be more

some sectarian, issues (interview with Abdulkhalaq, 2020).

The researcher also explored the operation of Iraq's security dilemma in a context of anarchy and self-help, the

diverging interests of national and foreign actors in Iraq, and groups' reciprocal fears. The validity of the security

dilemma framework is underlined by Iraq's position on the brink of collapse after the 2003 U.S. invasion, and meaning

groups existed within an atmosphere of self-defense. Ethnic and sectarian groups filled the vacuum after removing the

former regime and tried to maximize their interests and protection, increasing mistrust. Baghdad's central government

overthrow required the emerging groups, particularly irregular forces, to calculate risk. The ideal time for them to assert

their power was soon after Saddam's overthrow.

As a state, Iraq struggled to protect its different ethno-sectarian groups equally, and Kurds, Sunnis, and Shia existed in

a security dilemma and an "emerging anarchy" in which each group was concerned about their own security. The absence

of a stable government may be viewed as a driving factor for foreign interference and violent behavior by groups within

regional countries, particularly Turkey and Iran, also contributes to Kurds' reluctance to act aggressively. In the paper,

the technological aspect of the security dilemma is superseded by a groups' economic and political capabilities, which,

in addition to other variables such as historical grievances, ethnic groupings, extremism, and inflamed tensions,

exacerbate the security dilemma.

The paper sought to offer an in-depth analysis of crucial concerns related to the relationship between Iraq and ethno-

sectarian groups. Via the security dilemma lens, it also tried to interpret causes and leading factors in Iraq's ethno-

sectarian conflict. In Iraq's ethno-sectarian conflict, the paper suggests that the security dilemma plays a crucial role.