UKH Journal of Social Sciences | Volume 5 • Number 1 • 2021 84
individual's consciousness and attentiveness of his or her dignity are not prerequisites for gaining dignity, because
human dignity originates from mere humanity (Michalowski & Woods, 1999).
The GFCC vehemently established the irrelevancy of the social standing, the idiosyncratic individualities, and the
accomplishments of the persons for possessing human dignity, meaning every human being is entitled to and
possesses human dignity even in the case of incapability of acting meaningfully due to certain physical, psychological
or mental conditions. Therefore, the court ardently maintained that human dignity cannot be taken away or forfeited
even if the person conducted "undignified" behavior (Hall, 2008).
3.2 Human dignity and human rights, a mutually reinforcing relation
Dworkin's arguments are explained through a presuming hypothesis: There is a fundamental right that functions as a
fountainhead to all political rights. Therefore, in stressing the requirements of equal concern and respect, we seek to
defend the political rights more elaborately. By referring to this hypothesis, we can heighten and highlight the
enormous importance of certain interpretive notions in contemporary political theory, taking into consideration that
equality and liberty feature is prominently among these notions, in which they are almost collectively and unanimously
recognized as an abstract idea in mature well-established democracies. In such societies virtually all the people agree
that the governed should be treated with equal concern by the government, and they must be enabled to enjoy and
exercise their freedom to chart a successful life for themselves, however, this does not necessitate unanimity regarding
the right that follows those forms of abstract ideas (Dworkin, 2014).
Therefore, individuals should not be left vulnerable and unprotected from the outcome of certain majority decisions,
even if they were taken according to the prescribed procedures and intended to realize perceived public interest- so
right as "trump" overrides and overwhelms communitarian goals (Steinmann, 2016).
Dignity can also be characteristically operationalized as a "conversation stopper" (Parfenchyk & Flos, 2017) as the
ground for settling an issue because once it is invoked, it does not tolerate further discussion. The significant
consequence of this line of interpretation on preserving and sustaining the residual identity is profoundly pronounced
on the society which increasingly becomes more pluralistic in terms of values and adopts more relativistic in its
understanding and interpreting these values, therefore, its residual identity needs to be outlined negatively by taboo
concepts, human dignity meets these needs. This may interpret its absoluteness and why a great deal of emotionality
was attached to it (Bayertz, 1996).
What distinguishes Dworkinian characterization of dignity as a right is that under no circumstances, this right can be
trampled upon under the pretext of preserving and safeguarding the collective interests (Steinmann, 2016).
By emphasizing the fact that morality and law have a common foundation while morality enforces obligations
cornering others, which cover all domains of actions, modern law that relates to the creation of well-spelt out scopes
for exercising private choices that enable individuals to freely pursue their choices and determine their lives. The
revolutionary development in this respect is that what is not explicitly proscribed is directly permitted, on the other
hand, subjective rights have a peculiar character, and they are basic principles of the construction of the modern legal
system (Habermas, 2010).
The primary preoccupation of Dworkin is in concurrence with this perception, as he imagines constructing a just
society by seeking to determine its real laws and then executing and fulfilling those laws, all these through the
incorporation of two sets of values, the substantive values that are integrated into the positive law, and the procedural
ones with regards to some aspects like equality or liberty under the law (Keyes, 2016). Therefore, Dworkin provides
arguments for elevating human dignity to the highest possible status.
3.3 Rights and a case for recognizing human dignity as the highest value
Dworkin conceptualizes rights in terms of their degree of enforceability, and this fundamental theorization can be
utilized and employed as the underpinning of establishing and justification of hierarchical order, within which some
rights acquire higher inviolability and inalienability, and this is inextricably intertwined with the principles grounding
these rights, in a sense, it can be considered as transformative principles with transformational implications. Dworkin
tries to explain the weak and strong senses of right, but the question is that: can his conceptualization of rights
provide a sufficient ground for recognizing human dignity as the highest value. To answer this question, a detailed
analysis of Dworkin understanding of rights might be necessary. He makes a distinction between two kinds of rights:
First, when a government resorts to constrain a particular right, it formulates a policy in the form of collective welfare,
and it must provide some reliable evidence in this regard, this is the weak sense of right which relates to an individual
right (Dworkin, 2008). In this case, rights can be sacrificed, subordinated, abandoned, or restricted for the sake of
collective good, and rights do not generate an impregnable barrier against any governmental intrusion, leaving them in
a permanent situation of precariousness and vulnerability. Second, when a government is morally forbidden from
taking restrictive measures against a particular right, supposedly for the furtherance of general well-being, this can be
described as the strongest sense of right. So, in the strong sense, the underlying principles of the right are so forcefully