Ronald Dworkin and Human Dignity as Highest Constitutional Value: Philosophical Theorization of Rights and Human Dignity in a Comparative Perspective
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.25079/ukhjss.v5n1y2021.pp82-89Keywords:
Human Dignity, Right, Value, Principle of Constitution, Ronald Dworkin.Abstract
This paper focuses on the study of Ronald Dworkin and Human dignity as the highest constitutional value. Ronald Myles Dworkin (1931-2013), a famous American philosopher, jurist, and scholar of the United States constitutional law believes that constitutional provisions are permeated with moral principles and that human dignity is an intrinsic constitutional value, and that it must be considered in judicial decisions. Dworkin has his concept of rights, arguing that rights constitute claims against the state, and he espouses the idea that it is forbidden to sacrifice individual needs and preferences to achieve the public interest. That is, there are rights that the state cannot derogate from or violate, whatever the rationalizations and justifications. Dworkin categorically affirms that people have the right to be treated with dignity and that rights have an exceptional moral force that stems from the importance of human dignity, and that leads to preventing the formulation and implementation of specific policies even if they aim to enhance the general welfare of society. Consequently, his thoughts and reflections in this regard constitute a solid philosophical basis for the recognition of human dignity as the highest constitutional value.
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